18/05/2011

Why Track?

In junior high and high school, tracking was the only thing that made my life bearable. In my memory, normal classes were a combination of Waiting for Godot and Lord of the Flies.

14/05/2011

Die Betroffenheitsregel

So ergibt es sich, dass an der Spitze einer Gleichstellungsstelle regelmäßig eine Frau steht, nur ein Behinderter andere Behinderte vertreten kann und das Schwulenreferat selbstverständlich von einem bekennenden Homosexuellen geleitet werden muss.

[...]

Auch positive Diskriminierung bleibt Diskriminierung. Niemand käme auf die Idee, von einem Gesundheitspolitiker den Nachweis einer schweren Erkrankung zu erwarten oder von dem Vorsitzenden eines Rechts- und Innenausschusses die Abstammung aus einer Polizistenfamilie.

12/05/2011

The Poverty of Nonconsequentialism

Now, some people take the intuitive insanity of refusing to torture even to prevent the total annihilation of the universe as a devastating counterexample to non-consequentialist moral theories. I think this is a mistake based on a misunderstanding of the nature of morality and moral theory. Even the very best moral theory ever—one that organises and codifies our considered moral judgments better than any other—will sometimes generate the wrong advice. The usually unarticulated requirement that the very best moral theory ever have no notable counterexamples is arbitrarily over-demanding. A moral theory isn't a machine that takes in the specification of scenarios and spits out inerrant prescriptions. It is an intellectual refinement of our lived, evolving, socially-embodied morality, which is a body of largely tacit, often conflicting conventional rules and norms. The application of a moral theory requires the exercise of judgment at every step. Recognising the morally-relevant features of a scenario requires judgment. Identifying the rules and norms relevant to the circumstances requires judgment. Applying the relevant rules and norms appropriately requires judgment.

You may ask, "How do you know when a moral rule, such as 'don't torture', renders the wrong advice if the best moral theory always tells you that it is the right advice?" The answer is that you don't know. Sometimes exercising judgment amounts to little more than guessing and sometimes you'll guess wrong. Torture is categorically wrong, but it's not inconceivable that there are circumstances in which you should do it. However, there can be no general account of when you should do it, because generally you categorically shouldn't.

Will Wilkinson, "Torture Is Wrong"

10/05/2011

Adult-onset Adolsescence

If Objectivism seems familiar, it is because most people know it under another name: adolescence. Many of us experienced a few unfortunate years of invincible self-involvement, testing moral boundaries and prone to stormy egotism and hero worship.

08/05/2011

Actually by Mark Twain (I Think)

I didn't attend the funeral, but I sent a nice letter saying I approved of it.

Mark Twain

04/05/2011

In through the Back Door

Given the power of our prior beliefs to skew how we respond to new information, one thing is becoming clear: If you want someone to accept new evidence, make sure to present it to them in a context that doesn't trigger a defensive, emotional reaction.

[...]

In other words, paradoxically, you don't lead with the facts in order to convince. You lead with the values—so as to give the facts a fighting chance.

02/05/2011

Standard Reasoning Procedures

  • Ask random colleges student random policy questions and they will feel compelled to come up with opinions.
  • Ask them for reasons for those opinions and they’ll feel compelled to come up with such reasons.
  • Such opinions strongly tend to support the status quo – mostly whatever is, is assumed good.
  • There is only a weak added tendency for students to offer similar opinions and reasons on similar policy questions. Opinions and reasons are not being generated by processes that tend to produce much added similarity.
  • Students are mostly satisfied to grasp at any plausibly policy-relevant difference to justify treating things differently, even when such differences don’t obviously “make a difference” to the issue at hand.
Robin Hanson, "Natural Hypocrisy"